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The Law: Defending Congress's Interests 
in Court: How Lawmakers and the President 
Bargain over Department of Justice 
Representation 
NEAL DEVINS 
College of William ClJld Mary 
In understanding the willingness ofgovermnent lawyers to difend the constitutiomtlity offed-
eral statutes, this article will explain why presidents rarely make use of their powers zmder the Consti-
tution (allowing the president to rifuse to difend laws he finds unconstitutional) and underfederal 
law (placing the control of most government litigation with the attol7ley general). A ttention will be 
paid both to how Department of Justice lawyers enhance their power by difendingfederal statutes and 
to how Congress, if need be, can pressure tbe department to bow to lawmaker priferences. In conse-
quence, when the president refuses to difend a statute, courts have little reason to disregard article III 
constraints to resolve comtitutional challenges to federal laws . 
This article is a preliminary attempt to sort out two questions central to the smooth 
workings of our tripartite system of government: first, do government lawyers have a "duty 
to defend" acts of Congress? Second, ifit turns out that the White House refuses to defend 
Congress's handiwork, do lawmakers have the necessary resources and incentives to see to it 
that Congress's interests, ultimately, will be represented in court? The answer to the first 
question is a qualified no; the answer to the second question is a qualified yes. In particular, 
the president cannot refuse to enforce legislation because it is inconsistent with his policy 
preferences; he can, however, refuse to enforce/ defend legislation that he declares unconsti-
tutional. At the same time, Congress can defend its interests by making use of the weapons in 
its arsenal, including the power of the purse, the confirmation power, and the power to shift 
litigation authority away from the Department of Justice (DOJ). 
In making these points, I have divided this article into three sections. The first will 
detail the power of presidential review and, with it, why the president's refusal to defend the 
constitutionality of legislation is consistent with our system of checks and balances. This 
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section will also consider how Congress's power is further limited by Supreme Court restric-
tions on lawmakers' going into court to defend congressional prerogatives. The second sec-
tion will explain how it is that the president and Congress bargain over this issue. In so doing, 
I will highlight how political accommodations between the branches, not the formal divi-
sions of power specified in the Constitution, have resulted in a system that works reasonably 
well for both Congress and the White House. The third section will examine the Supreme 
Court's role in all of this, especially the Court's willingness to facilitate litigation between 
Congress and the White House through the appointment of counsel (intervenors and/or 
amicus) to defend Congress's interests in court. 
How the Constitution Limits Congress's Power 
to Have Its Interests Represented in Court 
In our tripartite system of government, a system of checks and balances, each branch is 
empowered to independently interpret the Constitution and, in so doing, serve as a bulwark 
against the aggrandizement of any other branch. Furthermore, each branch possesses core 
powers-powers that cannot be delegated to another branch. For example, according to arti-
cle III, courts can only hear "cases or controversies," not hypothetical disputes. In conse-
quence, even if rendering an advisory opinion were convenient to Congress and/or the 
White House, article III protects the Court from becoming subservient to the elected 
branches (Devins and Fitts 1997). Likewise, article II protects executive branch prerogatives. 
In particular, by independently interpreting the Constitution, presidents need not adhere to 
"unconstitutional" acts of Congress or to Supreme Court decisions. 
Before turning to the question of whether our system of checks and balances places 
any limits on presidential review, I will say few words on why article II empowers the presi-
dent this way. First and foremost, our tripartite system assumes that the executive is inde-
pendent from, not subordinate to, Congress and the courts. To maintain that independence, 
a president must be able to decide for himself what the Constitution means. By taking an 
oath to "faithfully execute" his office and to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitu-
tion, a president affirms that he will not knowingly act in violation of the Constitution as 
supreme law. For this reason, as recognized both in the Federalist Papers and in the debates 
over the Constitution's ratification, presidential review extends beyond the power to veto 
legislation on constitutional grounds and to a president's "ref us [alJ to carry into effect an act 
that, [in his opinion,] violates the Constitution" Games Wilson, as quoted in Jensen 1976, 
450). 
The power of presidential review, moreover, is amply supported by historical practice. 
Starting with Thomas Jefferson's decision to pardon "every person under punishment or 
prosecution under" the Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized speech critical of the 
government), presidents-by independently interpreting the Constitution-have departed 
from the constitutional judgments of Congress and the courts (Devins and Fisher 1998). The 
courts have also acknowledged presidential review. By refusing to hold the president in con-
tempt for failing to defend the constitutionality of Congress's handiwork, Supreme Court 
justices recognize that "the means [available to a president] to resist legislative encroach-
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ment[s)" include the power "even to disregard [laws]" that a president deems "unconstitu-
tional" (Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 906 [1991] [Scalia, J. 
concurring]). Presidential review, finally, is conceded by Congress. Recognizing that it can-
not "entrust the defense of its vital constitutional powers to the advocate[s 1 for the executive 
branch" (U.S. Senate 1977, 11), Congress has enacted legislation requiring the attorney gen-
eral to inform it of cases in which the DO] will not defend the constitutionality of a federal 
statute (Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 21 [a][2], 93 Stat. 1049-50). 
In saying that a president need not execute laws that he deems unconstitutional, I do 
not mean to suggest that there are no constitutional or prudential limits to the exercise of 
this power. A president, for example, cannot refuse to carry out a judicial order, even if he 
thinks the order is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution. That type of 
nonacquiescence would place a president above the Court, render the judicial power a nul-
lity, and ultimately cast doubt upon the very foundation of democratic government: 
namely, the rule of law. Moreover, to the extent that our tripartite system was designed to 
give each branch an opportunity to check the other, there is real appeal to the president's 
enforcing a law to set the stage for a court challenge. Indeed, out of respect for both Con-
gress's lawmaking prerogatives and the judicial power to interpret the Constitution, Office 
of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions allow for a president, as a matter of prudence, to enforce 
constitutionally suspect legislation. According to these opinions, "The President should pre-
sume that enactments are constitutional" and should "execute the statute, notwithstanding 
his own beliefs about the constitutional issue" ifhe thinks the Supreme Court would sustain 
the statute (OLC 1994,200). At the same time, the president cannot mute his own voice in 
the name of judicial review. As such, presidential review anticipates that executive branch fil-
ings will reflect the president's understanding of the Constitution. And while it would sim-
plifY matters if federal courts allowed the president to enforce a law while arguing that it is 
unconstitutional (Johnsen 2000; Waxman 2001), the article III "case or controversy" 
requirement may foreclose the executive from making arguments identical to the arguments 
made by the party challenging executive branch enforcement. 
What then of Congress's power to defend its institutional prerogatives by appearing as 
a party in lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of its handiwork? In 1978 and 1979, Con-
gress reacted to "a need for representation felt in the post-Watergate era" (Tiefer 1998, 48) by 
creating the Senate legal counsel and by directing the newly minted House general counsel 
to represent Congress's institutional interests through litigation. Congressional participa-
tion in litigation has also been facilitated by the aforementioned statute requiring the attor-
ney general to notifY Congress whenever the DO] refuses to defend the constitutionality of 
legislation. But when it comes to protecting Congress from presidential refusals to enforce 
or defend federal statutes (or, for that matter, presidential refusals to present legal arguments 
in a manner consistent with lawmaker preferences), these initiatives-while symbolically 
important-offer Congress limited protection. First, in the case of presidential 
nonenforcement, it may well be that there is no lawsuit and, consequently, no opportunity 
to defend the constitutionality of Congress's action. More to the point, federal courts adju-
dicate claims of actual injury, and as such, it is typically the case that the government must do 
something to someone before a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
federal legislation. Second, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, are reluctant to par-
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ticipate in internal disputes between Congress and the White House. In a 1997 decision 
rejecting the standing oflawmakers to challenge line item veto legislation (Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811 [1997]), the Court-as Justice Souter wrote in a concurring opinion-feared expos-
ing itself to the "risk" of becoming embroiled in "a power contest nearly at the height of its 
political tension" (ibid., 833). Likewise, courts have generally steered clear of disputes over 
congressional efforts to compel executive officials to turn over information, arguing that 
these matters are best resolved through bargaining between the White House and Congress 
(Devins 1996). 
I do not mean to suggest that Congress is without power here. For example, amicus 
briefs are regularly filed by individual lawmakers as well as House and Senate counsel. On 
rare occasions, moreover, the principal antagonists before the Supreme Court are the House 
and Senate (defending the constitutionality oflegislation) and the president (attacking it). 
But these occasions seem limited to disputes over the separation of powers; also, the Court 
has not resolved such a dispute since its 1997 decision limiting lawmaker standing (includ-
ing, one assumes, the standing of the Speaker of the House and his lawyer, the House general 
counsel). And if that is not enough, Senate legal counsel representation is contingent on a 
vote of the Senate and, as such, is limited to bipartisan matters. 
Congress, when all is said and done, cannot rely on its own agents to defend the consti-
tutionality of legislation (and, more generally, to ensure that the arguments it favors are 
made in court). At the same time, Congress's desires almost always find expression in litiga-
tion. One way or another, statutes that the president finds unconstitutional make their way 
into court. And when the DO] refuses to defend these statutes (or refuses to make all the 
arguments that Congress would like it to make), counsel for Congress or some private party 
can fill that void. Finally, Congress has been somewhat successful in convincing DO] law-
yers (and other government lawyers) to advance congressionally favored arguments in court. 
In the next part of this article, I will explain why Congress has been able to bargain suc-
cessfully with the president and agency heads over the types of arguments that government 
lawyers make in court. Specifically, I will argue that each side has strong incentives to work 
with the other. In other words, rather than look to the formal division of powers specified in 
the Constitution, Congress and the White House have forged accommodations that reflect 
the repeat-player nature of their interactions, that is, the need for each branch to work with 
the other to stave off gridlock 
How Congress-White House Bargaining Defines 
What Government Lawyers Say in Court 
Why is it that the president, as a general rule, is committed "to afford ling] the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch?" 
(OLC 1994,201). The separation of powers, if anything, forbids the president from defend-
ing a statute that he deems unconstitutional. Also, the very structure of the federal govern-
ment's litigation authority is largely designed to allow the attorney general to manage 
litigation as he or she sees fit. Congress has specified that "except as otherwise authorized by 
law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a 
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party, or is interested" is reserved to the DO] working "under the direction of the Attorney 
General" (Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 4[c], 80 Stat. 613). 
Yet the president has strong incentive to work with Congress. As I will now detail, Con-
gress can pressure the executive through anyone of a number of techniques, including the 
power to confi rm nominees, to cut off fu nds to the DO] and other executive agencies, to 
subject DO] officials to oversight hearings and other types of jawboning, and finally, to shift 
litigation authority away from the DO] (and the concomitant power to shift government 
operations away from the executive to independent agencies). Against this backdrop, it is lit-
tle wonder that the president almost always defends the constitutionality oflegislation; in 
particular, by accommodating Congress this way, the president gets something important in 
return-peace, that is, lawmaker acquiescence to DO] control of government litigation, espe-
cially Supreme Court litigation. Beyond this set of incentives, the president's willingness to 
defend acts of Congress can be tied to intra-executive pressures, especially the desires oflaw-
yers in the solicitor general's office (which handles Supreme Court litigation for the execu-
tive branch and most independent agencies). To maintain its reputation of being 
"handmaidens to the Supreme Court," (U.S. Senate 1985, 486), there are strong incentives 
for lawyers in the solicitor general's office to defend the constitutionality of statutes and, in 
this way, appear apolitical. 
How Congress Pressures Government Lawyers 
What follows are some examples of how Congress has used its various powers to affect 
what government lawyers say in court (focusing on DO] lawyers but also considering inde-
pendent agency lawyers whose heads, like the president, have the power to interpret the 
Constitution independently). 
Appropriations. Through its appropriations power, Congress has ample opportunity to 
pressure the attorney general, solicitor general, and other high-ranking government officials. 
For example, in response to a 1987 request to increase the appropriations for the Office of 
the Solicitor General, Congress held hearings "to make a critical assessment of the historical 
mission of this Office" (U.S. House 1987, 2). More telling, Congress, in 1983, enacted a limi-
tations rider preventing the DO] from asking the Supreme Court to abandon its per se ban 
on resale price maintenance agreements. Specifically, after the Reagan DO] filed a Supreme 
Court brief attacking the per se rule, Congress (before oral argument in the case) enacted leg-
islation providing that "[n]one of the funds appropriated ... may be used for any activity the 
purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance" 
(Pub. L. No. 98-166, $510, 97 Stat. 1102 (1983)). Likewise, Congress, in 1985, used its power 
of the purse to influence (albeit in a small way) the government's handling of litigation 
involving the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1200). 
As originally enacted, disappointed bidders for government contracts could stay the award 
of the contract by filing a protest with the comptroller general. President Ronald Reagan 
thought the statute unconstitutional (by having a legislative official, the comptroller general, 
oversee the awarding of government contracts, an executive branch function). Through the 
Office of Management and Budget, Reagan directed executive agencies to ignore the statute 
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(Office of Management and Budget 1984). Notwithstanding this directive, a federal district 
court concluded that the government could not ignore the statute (responding to a com-
plaint filed by a disappointed bidder who wanted to take advantage of the stay provision) 
(Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps ojEngineers, 607 F. Supp. 962, 963 [D.N.]. 1985]). The White 
House, however, refused to bend. Attorney General Edwin Meese, for example, told the 
House Judiciary Committee that the government would ignore any lower court decision on 
the issue. In response, the House Government Operations Committee voted to cut off all 
funds for the Office of Attorney General, prompting the Reagan administration to instruct 
agencies to comply with the stay provision and, in this way, back away from its hard-line 
position (Fisher 1998, 115; Struck 1985). 
An even more dramatic example of Congress using its appropriations power involved 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent agency with the power 
to litigate cases before federal courts of appeal. In 1987, Congress took aim at FCC efforts to 
reexamine its policies on race preferences and the concurrent ownership of newspapers and 
television stations (Devins 1993). Specifically, Congress enacted limitation riders prohibit-
ing the FCC "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to begin or continue a re-exami-
nation of" these policies (Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329). In this way, Congress 
intended to back the FCC into a corner, effectively compelling it to defend the constitution-
ality of these policies. Indeed, the Senate report accompanying the affirmative action rider 
specifically "instruct[ed] the Commission" to defend race preferences in several pending 
D.C. Circuit cases (U.S. Senate 1987, 77). And while the FCC could have argued that Con-
gress cannot undermine its power to interpret the Constitution, it instead abided by Con-
gress's unorthodox request. 
Conjilmations. The Senate sees its confirmation power as a way of securing promises 
from DO] nominees about their willingness to enforce the law as written by Congress, 
including the defense of federal statutes. For example, when confirming solicitor general 
nominees Seth Waxman (nominated by Clinton in 1997) and Ted Olson (nominated by 
Bush in 2001), senators focused their inquiry on the willingness of these nominees to-if 
need be-break rank with White House policy preferences by defending all federal statutes. 
On this score, the Olson hearings are especially instructive; Senate Democrats secured 
promises from Olson that he would defend Congress's power under the Constitution's 
spending clause as well as proposed campaign finance reform legislation (U.S. Senate 2001). 
Perhaps more telling (although not involving a dispute over the DOTs willingness to defend 
the constitutionality oflegislation), Congress, in 1994, utilized its confirmation power to 
rein in DO] policy making on environmental crimes. By holding the nomination of Lois 
Schiffer, Clinton's choice to head the DOTs environment division, Congress forced the 
DO] to restructure its environmental criminal enforcement operation to satisfY lawmaker 
demands. Specifically, the Clinton DO] returned control of environmental criminal 
enforcement to decentralized U.S. attorney's offices and away from main Justice (Devins 
and Herz 1998,214-15). 
Jawboning. Congress sometimes communicates its disapproval of DO] filings through 
oversight hearings and other jawboning techniques. Oversight hearings, for example, were 
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held to question DO] oHicials about their failure to enforce a 1968 statute overriding 
Miranda v. Arizona (Cassell 1999) as well as Reagan DO] efforts to moot Bob Jones University, 
a First Amendment challenge to the then-existing IRS policy of denying tax breaks to racist 
schools (U.S. House 1982). Also, in 1993, Congress lashed out at Clinton DO] efforts to 
limit the force of a 1984 child pornography law (Pub. L. No. 87-292, § 5[a] [4],98 Stat. 205). 
Specifically, rejecting arguments successfully advanced by the prior administration, the 
Clinton DO] joined forces with the American Civil Liberties Union in arguing that the stat-
ute did not apply to young girls dressed in scanty apparel (Greenhouse 1993). In so doing, 
the DO] sought to prevent the Supreme Court from ruling on the issue, because its views 
and the criminal defendant's views were in sync with each other (ibid.). But Congress 
responded with a vengeance. All one hundred senators voted for a resolution condemning 
the brief, and a 1994 crime bill included a section expressing Congress's sense that the 1984 
law, in fact, did apply to children wearing scanty apparel (Greenhouse 1995). Responding to 
this intense jawboning, the Clinton DO] relented, shifting its position in court and arguing 
in favor of a broad interpretation of the 1984 law (ibid.). 
Litigation autbority. The most potent of Congress's weapons to affect government law-
yering is placing litigation authority in some entity (typically an independent agency) oute 
side of the DO]. For example, in response to the perceived failure of the DO] to represent 
adequately the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Congress granted the FTC independent 
litigating authority as part of the 1975 FTC Improvements Act (Devins 1994,269-77). On 
other occasions, Congress has been able to defang the DO] without explicitly removing its 
litigation authority. Consider, for example, how Congress expressed its disapproval of DO] 
representation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When the DO] refused to 
sue federal entities for violating environmental laws (claiming that such lawsuits were imper-
missible on both sovereign immunity and article III standing grounds), Congress limited 
DO] authority in two ways (Devins and Herz 1998,216-17). First, it waived sovereign immu-
nity so that states and environmental interests could sue federal polluters. Second, it autho-
rized the EPA to conduct administrative enforcement actions against federal facilities so that 
the government did not need to sue itself in federal court. 
For the most part, however, Congress does not make use of its power over litigation 
authority. Appropriations, jawboning, and confirmations ardess draconian techniques that 
have worked quite well in practice. Also, since the president must sign legislation establish-
ing or transferring litigation authority outside the DO], Congress is limited in its ability to 
affect litigation authority. Finally, Congress, a reactive institution, is far more interested in 
getting the DO] to do its bidding in a particular dispute than it is in redefining who speaks 
the government's voice in court. 
How Government Lawyers Defend Their Turf 
In detailing how Congress sometimes pressures government lawyers to defend Con-
gress's interests in court, I think it important to remember that these episodes are truly 
extraordinary. The president hardly ever deems a federal statute unenforceable for constitu-
tional reasons. Moreover, the DO] is quite happy to defend the constitutionality of federal 
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statutes, for its status is enhanced by routinely making such defenses. Perhaps more signifi-
cant, Congress is generally accepting both of the power of government lawyers to craft legal 
arguments and the power of the president to, on rare occasion, decline to defend a statute. In 
part, this acquiescence is a by-product of the fact that some litigant (whether it be an inde-
pendent agency, a private party, or Congress itself) is defending the constitutionality of the 
law. And as long as a court will hear the case, House and Senate counsel and/or individual 
lawmakers can file amicus briefs. In other words, as I will now explain, the system works rea-
sonably well for both government lawyers and congressional interests. 
To start, the president's willingness to enforce all (or nearly all) of the laws and, corre-
spondingly, the presumption of constitutionality accorded legislation by the DO] is a 
by-product of the legalistic, court-centered culture that often dominates the DO]. In partic-
ular, the OLC (which advises the president and executive agencies on constitutional ques-
tions) and the solicitor general's office are committed to norms of professionalism and 
independence, including the corresponding ideals of precedent and judicial-style decision 
making. The OLC, for example, is intensely interested in "upholding the reputation of the 
office as an elite institution whose legal advice is independent of the policy and political 
pressures associated with a particular question" (McGinnis 1993,422). It is little wonder that 
such an institution would embrace judicial resolution of constitutional issues; otherwise, the 
OLC would be subject to charges of twisting its constitutional interpretations so that the 
president could put his policy agenda into place (by, for example, refusing to enforce laws 
that he dislikes). Likewise, the solicitor general's reputation for professionalism and inde-
pendence is tied to the myth that his allegiances run outside of the executive branch and to 
the Supreme Court and, more generally, the rule oflaw (Caplan 1987). And while this myth 
misleads as much as it informs (Clegg 1987), it is certainly true that the solicitor general maxi-
mizes influence with both the Supreme Court and other parts of the government by seeing 
himselfboth as an officer of the Court and an advocate for the government. Specifically, the 
power of the solicitor general (and especially the careerist attorneys who work under him) is 
tied to his reputation for independence. Accordingly, there is little incentive to refuse to 
defend an act of Congress, especially when such a decision places his office on the sidelines 
and opens him up to charges of acting politically. 
Because government lawyers are almost always defending federal statutes in court, 
Congress rarely involves itselfin government lawyering. Instead, Congress's practice is t91et 
government lawyers make whatever arguments they like in court, including, on occasion, 
arguments that Congress's handiwork is unconstitutional. Before the Supreme Court, for 
example, the solicitor general has filed competing briefs in the same case (one arguing for 
constitutionality, one arguing against) (Waxman 2001,1081-82), presented competing argu-
ments in the same brief (Devins 1994, 314), and informed the justices that the president and 
the DO] think the statute before them is unconstitutional but that "it is fair to Con-
gress-and, indeed, it is fair to this court-that the other view of constitutional power should 
be fully and fairly presented" (Briefforthe United States at 28, Milesv. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 
[1925]). Needless to say, were the DO] to regularly engage in such Congress bashing, law-
makers might make aggressive use of their powers of the purse, confirmations, and the like. 
But these statements are quite unusual and, as such, Congress rarely feels the need to 
respond to them. 
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Much the same can be said of instances in which government lawyers refuse to defend 
the constitutionality oflegislation. Here, however, the critical question seems to be whether 
that refusal could moot the case (as was true with Bob Jones University and the Clinton-era 
child pornography case). More to the point, as long as someone is vigorously defending the 
constitutionality of the statute, Congress seems amenable to that someone's being an entity 
other than the DO] (as long as the DO] views such cases as truly extraordinary). For example, 
in Metro Broadcastingv. FCC (497 U.S. 547 [1990]), the solicitor general allowed the FCC to 
defend congressionally mandated diversity preferences before the Supreme Court-so that it 
could attack these preferences without dismissing the case on mootness grounds. Likewise, 
Congress did not protest the solicitor general's refusals to defend either the independent 
counsel statute or legislation creating the Federal Election Commission (FE C)-so that the 
defense of these statutes was left to the FEC and the independent counsel. More striking, 
Congress did not blink when the DO] argued in court that the 1984 Competition in Con-
tracting Act was unconstitutional (even though Congress had just prodded the Reagan DO] 
into enforcing the law). Apparently, lawmakers took comfort in the fact that, since this law-
suit was filed by a private contractor seeking judicial enforcement of the statute, there was no 
risk of the case being tossed out on mootness grounds. Indeed, in nearly all of these cases, 
Congress participated-by either filing an amicus brief or participating as a party-intervenor. 
As the above discussion reveals, Congress and the president have good reason to feel 
satisfied with the current arrangement. On those rare instances in which Congress disap-
proves of what government lawyers are saying in court, Congress has the institutional 
resources to advance its agenda with the DO] and other parts of government. For their part, 
government lawyers almost always can make the argument they want in court. At the end of 
the day, presidential review has allowed the White House to interpret the Constitution with-
out denying Congress an opportunity to have some advocate (even if it is not the DO]) 
defend the constitutionality oflegislation. As long as this arrangement can be maintained, 
comity between the branches should remain the norm. 
Indeed, comity between the branches is sufficiently strong that, on occasion, Congress 
has amended some laws in the face of solicitor general claims of unconstitutionality. For 
example, after the solicitor general informed Congress that he agreed with a lower court rul-
ing that a statute providing reimbursement to Christian Scientists for nonmedical nursing 
care was unconstitutional (Children's Healthcare Is LegaIDuty'l/.Vladeck, 938 F.Supp. 1466 [D. 
Minn. 1996]), Congress worked with the DO] in rewriting the statute (Waxman 2001, 
1080-81). Even more striking, Congress accommodated the DO] by amending a 1996 stat-
ute that required the discharge of HI V-infected service members, even those who were medi-
cally able to serve (Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 567, 110 Stat. 186 repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
tit. II, § 2707 [ a][l], 110 Stat. 1321,1321-30). Specifically, after claiming that itwould enforce 
the statute to facilitate a court challenge to it, the Clinton White House, instead, delayed 
enforcement so that it could seek a compromise with Congress (Barron 2000, 101). Absent 
the goodwill engendered by the DOl's regularly defending federal statutes, it is doubtful 
whether lawmakers would have engaged in such bargaining. 
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The Courts' Role in Facilitating 
White House-Congress Comity 
At the start of this article, I spoke of the courts' general reluctance to mediate 
intermural squabbles between the executive and legislative branches, including lawsuits filed 
by members of Congress. In concluding the article, I would like to discuss one notable 
exception to this norm. On occasion, by allowing Congress to intervene as a party to defend 
the constitutionality oflegislation or by appointing amici to defend Congress's interests, the 
Court has ruled on the constitutionality offederal statutes in cases in which the DO] and the 
party challenging the statute agreed with each other. In some ways, this practice facilitates 
comity between the branches; after all, it ensures that the DO] cannot nullifY legislation by 
refusing to defend it. With that said, courts must operate within the parameters established 
by article III of the Constitution. 
In sorting out whether and when this practice is permissible, I will discuss two notable 
examples of it-Dickerson v. United States (530 U.S. 428 [2000» and INS v. Chadha (462 U.S. 
919 [1983]). First, Dickerson: Here, after a federal appellate court sua sponte invoked the 
Miranda override statute, the Clinton DO] concluded that the criminal defendant was cor-
rect in arguing that the override statute was unconstitutional (Devins 2000). At the same 
time, the Clinton DO] thought that the government had satisfied its burdens under Miranda 
and, consequently, did not want to dismiss the case. Presented with a truly adversarial dispute 
over the criminal defendant's guilt, the Supreme Court-rather than dismiss the suit-elected 
to appoint an amici to defend the statute. In my view, this highly unusual action was appro-
priate (assuming, that is, that the appellate court was correct in sua sponte raising the over-
ride statute). Consider the alternative: namely, forcing the president to either defend a 
statute he finds unconstitutional (something clearly inconsistent with the president's article 
II powers) or having the DO] release a criminal defendant who, in the president's view, 
broke the law (also inconsistent with the president's article II duty to execute the law). 
Contrast these facts to the situation in INS v. Chadha. In Chadha, the DO] refused to 
defend the constitutionality of the legislative veto, preferring, instead, to argue that the veto 
undermined the president's power to execute the law. Specifically, the DO] thought that a 
decision by the attorney general to suspend a deportation was unreviewable by Congress 
(absent the enactment oflegislation satisfYing the Constitution's demands of bicameralism 
and presentment). Rather than treat the legislative veto as a nullity (by refusing to deport 
Chadha), however, the DO] argued that it was willing to enforce a court ruling upholding 
the veto. For this reason, the DO] argued that the Court should settle this "dispute," not-
withstanding the case's apparent lack of adversariness. By allowing counsel for the House 
and Senate to intervene, the Supreme Court went along with the DOTs campaign for a 
definitive judicial resolution of the legislative veto's constitutionality. But it should not 
have. Unlike Dickerson, a decision dismissing Chadha would not have interfered with the 
president's article II powers to both interpret the Constitution and "faithfully execute the 
laws." The only thing preventing the attorney general from suspending Chadha's deporta-
tion was his hope that the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto. Correspondingly, as an article III matter, the Chadha litigation was an 
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abomination. The desire for a court decision, in and of itself, does not support judicial reso-
lution of a case in which there is no disagreement. 
The lesson here is simple. A president's power to interpret the Constitution is not the 
power to demand judicial rulings on these interpretations. Sometimes, a president and Con-
gress need to do battle with each other over the Constitution's meaning. In Chadha, the pres-
ident's squabble was with Congress. While seeking cover behind a court ruling may have 
made political sense to the president, he should have taken his complaint to Congress. 
Sometimes, however, courts should intercede in what appears to be a dispute between the 
political branches. In Dickerson, the presence of a clearly adversarial dispute necessitated the 
appointment of an amicus to defend the Miranda override statute. Otherwise, the presi-
dent's article II power to interpret the Constitution independently would have been jeopar-
dized. In the end, fidelity to the separation of powers-not a desire to enhance the judiciary's 
power to expound on public values-may well explain the Court's action in Dickerson. 
Conclusion 
On issues involving government lawyering, Congress and the White House have 
ample incentives and resources to both defend their interests and work with the other. For 
this very reason, Congress is accepting of a litigation model that almost always leaves it to the 
president or his designee, the attorney general, to determine whether and how the govern-
ment will defend the constitutionality of federal legislation. In particular, because Con-
gress's interest in having the government defend federal legislation is typically in sync with 
the institutional interests of the OLC and solicitor general's office, Congress may well be 
better off embracing the current hierarchical model (as compared, say, to decentralizing liti-
gation authority among executive and independent agencies). In consequence, although 
some amount of conflict is inevitable, the best way to resolve that conflict is to let the White 
House and Congress bargain with each other. For this reason, it is wrong for courts to disre-
gard article III constraints in an effort to facilitate the judicial resolution of constitutional 
questions. 
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